Retention Contracts under Partial Information Electoral Competition Case Study
أغسطس 01, 2022
zina houhamdi
Belkacem Athamena
Ghaleb El Refae
This study copes with a class of principal-agent problems where information asymmetry represents an important characteristic. The paper examines the relationship between the principal and agents. The principal has to perform two agents’ screening and discipline tasks. To complete his duties, the principal lacks complete information concerning the agents’ behavior and rarely has partial information regarding the failure or success of launched tactics, alliances, rationalization, etc. We analyze ...
Retention contracts with asymmetric information: optimistic approach vs pessimistic approach
أغسطس 01, 2022
Belkacem Athamena
zina houhamdi
Ghaleb El Refae
Purpose: This paper aims to focus on the utilization of retention contracts to screen and discipline managers in a context in which the council, board of directors, possesses incomplete information about the consequences of managers’ decisions. The analysis enlightens us on empire building, on the slight connection between achievement and firing, and describes concerns about the belief that low achievements result from bad managers. Design/methodology/approach: This paper analyzes a basic model...